Author:
Houghton, Vince, author.
ImprintIthaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 2019.
Description239 pages ; 24 cm
Note:Introduction : the principal uncertainty -- A reasonable fear : American (mis)perception of the German nuclear program -- Making something out of nothing : the creation of American nuclear intelligence -- Alsos : the mission to solve the mystery of the German bomb -- Transitions : from the German threat to the Soviet menace -- Regression : the post-war devolution of American nuclear intelligence -- Whistling in the dark : American (mis)perception of the Soviet nuclear program -- Conclusion : credit where credit is due.
Bibliography Note:Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-223) and index.
Note:"Explores why the United States government, considering how successfully it conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in World War II, was unable to create an effective atomic intelligence system to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities"-- Provided by publisher.
