Author:
Mueller, Dennis C.
Imprint:Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt. : E. Elgar, c1993.
Descriptionxxii, 525 p. : illus. ; 24 cm.
Note:Constitutional democracy and social welfare. - The utilitarian contract: a generalization of Rawls' Theory of Justice (with Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett) - Intergenerational justice and the social discount rate. - Achieving the just polity. - The social contract and collective choice. - Choosing a constitution in East Europe: lessons from public choice. - Constitutional rights. - Individualism, contractarianism, and morality. - Solving the intensity problem in representative democracy (with Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett). - On equalizing the distribution of political income (with Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett) - Representative democracy via random selection (with Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett) - The social gains from exchanging votes: a simulation approach (with Geoffrey C. Philpotts and Jaroslav Vanek) - Voting by veto. - Voting by veto and majority rule. - Probabilistic majority rule.
Note:Allocation, redistribution, and collective choice. - The Pareto optimal approach to income redistribution: a fiscal application (with George M. von Furstenberg) - Redistribution, growth, and political stability. - Electoral politics, interest groups, and the size of government (with Peter J. Goughlin and Peter Murrell) - Interest groups and the size of government (with Peter Murrell) - The growth of government: a public choice perspective. - James M. Buchanan: economist cum contractarian. - The "Virginia School" and public choice. - Public choice: a survey. - Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postualte for a descriptive theory of human behavior. - The future of public choice.
Bibliography Note:Includes bibliographical references and index.
