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Leader |
LDR
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cam a 00 |
Control # |
1
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2003065936 |
Control # Id |
3
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DLC |
Date |
5
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20230403155208.0 |
Fixed Data |
8
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031031s2004 inu b 001 0 eng |
LC Card |
10
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$a 2003065936 |
ISBN |
20
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$a0865975205 (alk. paper) |
ISBN |
20
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$a0865975310 (pbk.) |
Obsolete |
39
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|
$a215904$cTLC |
Cat. Source |
40
|
|
$aDLC$cDLC$dGCG |
Authen. Ctr. |
42
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|
$apcc |
LC Call |
50
|
00 |
$aHB846.8$b.T837 2004 |
Dewey Class |
82
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00 |
$a330$222 |
ME:Pers Name |
100
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1 |
$aTullock, Gordon. |
Title |
245
|
10 |
$aVirginia political economy /$cGordon Tullock, edited and with an introduction by Charles K. Rowley. |
Imprint |
260
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$aIndianapolis, IN :$bLiberty Fund,$c2004. |
Phys Descrpt |
300
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$a642 p.;$c24 cm. |
Series:Diff |
490
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1 |
$aThe selected works of Gordon Tullock ;$vv. 1 |
Note:Bibliog |
504
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|
$aIncludes bibliographical references and index. |
Note:Content |
505
|
10 |
$tEconomic imperialism. -$tPublic choice. -$tPublic choice--what I hope for the next 25 years. -$tCasual recollections of an editor. -$tProblems of majority voting. -$tThe irrationality of intransitivity. -$tEntry barriers in politics. -$tFederalism: problems of scale. -$tThe general irrelevance of the general impossibility theorem. -$tWhy so much stability. -$tIs there a paradox of voting? -$tA new and superior process for making social choices (T. Nicolaus Tideman and Gordon Tullock) -$tThe demand-revealing process as a welfare indicator. -$tDemand-revealing process, coalitions, and public goods. -$tThe welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. -$tThe cost of transfers. -$tMore on the welfare costs of transfers. -$tCompeting for aid. -$tThe transitional gains trap. -$tEfficient rent seeking. -$tRent seeking. -$tInheritance justified. -$tInheritance rejustified. -$tThe charity of the uncharitable. -$tThe rhetoric and reality of redistribution. |
Note:Content |
505
|
10 |
$tDynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy. -$tThe expanding public sector: Wagner squared (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) -$tThe edge of the jungle. -$tCorruption and anarchy. -$tThe paradox of revolution. -$tRationality and revolution. -$tPublic and private interaction under reciprocal externality (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) -$tSocial cost and government action. -$tPublic decisions as public goods. -$tInformation without profit. -$tPolluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes, and Reply (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) -$tHawks, doves, and free riders. -$tAn economic approach to crime. -$tThe costs of a legal system (Warren F. Schwartz and Gordon Tullock) -$tOn the efficient organization of trials. -$tOn the efficient organization of trials: reply to McChesney, and Ordover and Weitzman. -$tJudicial errors and a proposal for reform (I.J. Good and Gordon Tullock) -$tCourt errors. -$tLegal heresy: presidential address to the Western Economic Association annual meeting, 1995. -$tJuries. -$tThe coal tit as a careful shopper. -$tBiological externalities. -$tBiological applications of economics. -$tThe economics of (very) primitive societies. -$tA (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory. -$tHow to do well while doing good! |
Subj:Topical |
650
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0 |
$aSocial choice. |
Subj:Topical |
650
|
0 |
$aEconomics$xPolitical aspects. |
Subj:Topical |
650
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0 |
$aEconomics$xSociological aspects. |
Subj:Pers |
600
|
10 |
$aTullock, Gordon. |
AE:Pers Name |
700
|
1 |
$aRowley, Charles K.,$d1939-2013. |
SE:Pers Name |
800
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1 |
$aTullock, Gordon.$tWorks.$kSelections.$f2005$vv. 1. |